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MECHANICAL  CAUSALITY  IN  CHILDREN’S  “FOLKBIOLOGY” 
 
I. DO CHILDREN HAVE FOLKBIOLOGY? 
 How do children explain and reason about biological phenomena?  One idea that has set 
much of the research agenda for this topic since mid 1980’s--put forth by Carey (1985, 1991)--is 
that young children use their knowledge about people to do the job.  So, children may confuse 
biology with psychology, and they may think that all animate phenomena (e.g., growth, 
biological inheritance, life, death, illness) are governed by socio-psychological factors (e.g., 
motivations, feelings, beliefs, or attention to social forces such as morality and convention).  For 
instance, preschool children talk about the origin of babies mostly in terms of the parents’ 
intentional behavior such as going out to a store to buy a baby or making a baby and placing it in 
the mother’s tummy (Bernstein & Cowan, 1975; Goldman & Goldman, 1982).  Carey (1985, 
1991) concluded from an extensive review of previous research that children do not seem to 
understand any uniquely biological causal mechanisms prior to age ten.  Moreover, young 
children seem to use people as a prototype for reasoning about novel and nonobvious attributes 
of biological kinds (Carey, 1985).  For example, preschool children often generalize a novel 
property such as “has a spleen” from people to other animals (e.g., dogs, birds, bees) primarily 
on the basis of how similar the other animals are to people.  Such inductive inferences are quite 
sensible, even though not always correct.  But interestingly, if the property is taught on dogs or 
bees, preschool children do not generalize it to people and other kinds of animals.  Based on 
these and other kinds of evidence, Carey (1985, 1991) argued that a folkbiology might emerge 
from a folk psychology (or a folk theory of people), and children might not construct their first 
autonomous biology until age ten or so. 
 
 In response to this important and controversial proposal, considerable research efforts 
have been devoted to studying children's early knowledge about biological kinds.  To date, there 
is rather compelling evidence that children begin to distinguish plants and animals from human 
artifacts by age three or four (e.g., Backscheider, Shatz, & Gelman, 1993; Hickling & Gelman, 
1995; Keil, 1994); some children can apply their inchoate understanding of the biological-
nonbiological distinction to novel entities (e.g., germs) as well as familiar ones by age five (Au 
& Romo, 1996; see also Keil, 1992).  In other words, even before school age, children begin to 
sort out the ontologicial categories “biological kinds” and “nonbiological kinds” (see also 
Gelman, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, in press). 
 
 In addition to outlining the ontology in a domain, however, a framework theory should 
also specify basic causal devices in that domain in order to offer coherent bases for reasoning 
about relevant phenomena (e.g., Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & 
Gelman, 1992).  To be credited with a folkbiology, then, children have to go beyond making an 
ontological distinction between biological and nonbiological kinds.  They must also have some 
ideas about causal devices or mechanisms that apply only to biological phenomena.  Given the 
importance of uniquely biological causal mechanisms in deciding whether a set of beliefs 
qualifies as a folkbiology, it is no coincidence that such mechanisms constitute a major 
battleground for the debate on when children construct their first autonomous biology. 
 
 
II. DO CHILDREN KNOW ANY UNIQUELY BIOLOGICAL CAUSAL MECHANISMS? 
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 Researchers including Hatano and Inagaki (1994), Keil (1992, 1994), and Springer (1995; 
Springer & Keil, 1991; Springer, Nguyen, Samaniego, 1996; Springer & Ruckel, 1992) have 
argued that, prior to age six or seven, children understand some causal principles in the domain 
of biological kinds.  On the other hand, Carey (1985, 1991, 1995; Carey & Spelke, 1994), Atran 
(1994), and Solomon (Solomon & Cassimatis, 1995; Solomon, Johnson, Zaitchik, & Carey, 
1996) have argued that children's early knowledge of biological kinds does not include explicit 
biological causal principles.  But underneath all the arguments between these two camps lies a 
consensus (see also Au & Romo, 1996).  Namely, most if not all participants of this debate seem 
to agree that, by age six or seven, children can understand some causal principles for explaining 
biological phenomena--now that Carey and her colleagues (1995; Carey & Spelke, 1994; 
Solomon et al., 1996) put the probable age onset at six or seven to accommodate recent evidence 
of early inchoate biological knowledge (e.g., Gelman, 1996; Hatano & Inagaki, in press; Inagaki 
& Hatano, 1993; Keil, 1992; Springer & Keil, 1991; Wellman & Gelman, in press). 
 
 We actually want to go against the tide by arguing that an understanding of any true 
biological causal mechanism is not something children pick up intuitively in everyday life.  Even 
what Carey and her colleagues are willing to accept as evidence for such understanding--which 
we will review presently--is not about causal mechanisms per se.  Rather, it is about causal input-
output relations.  Now is probably as good a time as any to explain the quotation marks around 
“folkbiology” in the title of this chapter: Mechanical Causality in Children’s “Folkbiology.”  
We chose this title because we are not convinced that children, or adults for that matter, 
spontaneously construct uniquely biological causal mechanisms from their everyday experience.  
No study that we know of has demonstrated that children or adults--without the benefit of 
science education--make use of such causal mechanisms to explain or reason about biological 
phenomena.  So, if domain-specific causal devices constitute an integral part of any folk theory, 
then none of the folk conceptions about biological kinds documented to date seem to qualify as a 
folk theory (cf. Atran, 1994, 1995, in press).  Where does this line of argument lead us?  Not a 
very enviable spot, we must say.  In some sense, we are questioning whether folkbiology--the 
very title of this edited volume--might be a contradiction in term.  If neither children nor adults 
spontaneously construct uniquely biological causal mechanisms from everyday experience, can 
we really consider their folk conceptions about biological kinds to be folkbiologies?  Because we 
are taking a rather precarious (if not indeed radical) position, we had better build our case 
carefully to make sure that our chapter will not be pulled from this collection of essays on 
folkbiology. 
 
 Much of the research on children’s understanding of biological phenomena has focused 
on biological processes, input-output relations, causal agents (e.g., vital force, essence, innards), 
and so forth, rather than causal devices or mechanisms per se.  Because comprehensive reviews 
of this research literature already exist (Gelman, 1996; Hatano & Inagaki, in press; Wellman & 
Gelman, in press), we will try to be selective here. 
 
 
 
BIOLOGICAL VERSUS PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 
 Children begin to distinguish biological processes from psychological ones by age four or 
five.  They appreciate that some processes (e.g., growth, breathing) cannot be stopped by 
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intention alone.  For instance, people cannot prevent an animal from growing bigger and old, just 
because they want it to remain small and cute (Inagaki & Hatano, 1987).  They also recognize 
that bodily processes such as running speed and psychological processes such as forgetfulness 
tend to be modified by different means--in these examples, by exercise and mental monitoring, 
respectively (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993).  Moreover, 6-year-olds tend to attribute biological 
properties such as "has blood" and "sleeps" to predatory and domestic animals at the same rate, 
but they attribute psychological properties such as "can feel happy" and "can feel scared" more to 
domestic animals.  By age eight, children use taxonomic groups (e.g., mammals, birds, reptile, 
fish) as a basis for attributing biological but not psychological properties.  They use the predatory 
vs. domestic distinction to attribute psychological (e.g., "can feel pain," "is smart," "can feel 
scared") but not biological properties (Coley, 1995). 
 
 In several ecologically significant areas--growth, illness, kinship--children show rather 
impressive understanding from their preschool years on.  For instance, preschool children know 
that "growth" and “self-healing” are unique to plants and animals (Carey, 1985; Rosengren, 
Gelman, Kalish, & McCormick, 1991; Backscheider, Shatz, & Gelman, 1993).  From age six on, 
some children spontaneously attribute “can grow bigger” to novel entities such as germs (Au & 
Romo, 1996).  Preschoolers also know about constraints on growth and development:  Animals 
get bigger not smaller and become structurally more complex not simpler (e.g., from caterpillar 
to butterfly and not vice versa; Rosengren et al., 1991). 
 
 In the domain of illness, preschool children appreciate that illness and contamination can 
be caused by germs.  Because germs are so tiny that they are not readily perceptible, children 
probably learn about germs primarily through language.  Nonetheless, by age six, children 
manage to construct rather sophisticated beliefs about germs:  Germs exist despite absence of 
perceptible evidence; germs can live, die, and grow bigger; germs can make people sick (e.g., Au 
& Romo, 1996; Au, Sidle, & Rollins, 1993; Kalish, 1996; Siegal, 1988; Rosen & Rozin, 1993). 
 
 Children's early knowledge of parent-child resemblance is equally impressive.  For 
instance, preschool children expect that animals of the same family, more so than unrelated but 
similar looking animals, to share certain properties such as tiny bones, or an ability to see in the 
dark (Springer, 1992).  They also expect that underlying essential nature is inherited and 
unaffected by upbringing.  That is, a calf raised among pigs will grow up to moo and have a 
straight tail (Gelman & Wellman, 1991); a human baby shares racial characteristics with the 
biological parents rather than adoptive parents (Hirschfeld, 1994, in press).  Whether children 
project novel, inherent characteristics from birth parents but not adoptive parents to 
birth/adoptive children remains an open question (e.g., Solomon et al., 1996; Springer, 1995).  
Nonetheless, children's inchoate understanding of parent-child resemblance seems to include 
some kind of causal input-output relations (i.e., input = some characteristics of the parents; 
output = similar characteristics in their baby).  How the input is turned into the output--i.e., the 
causal mechanism--however, remains unspecified (Au & Romo, 1996; Carey, 1995). 
 To characterize children’s early knowledge about biological kinds, there are several 
proposals about underlying causal principles: vitalistic causality (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994; 
Inagaki & Hatano, 1993), functional-teleological explanations (Keil, 1992, 1994), essence (S. 
Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994), innards (e.g., R. Gelman, 1990).  While each proposal has 
considerable empirical support, it remains unclear to what extent these proposed causal agents 
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are uniquely biological.  How different is vital force from fuel in getting some machinery 
(human and otherwise) to work?  How different is the role of function in driving the evolution of 
biological kinds and the evolution of technology and artifacts?  How different is the essence for 
biological kinds from that for chemicals?  How do innards differ for biological versus 
nonbiological kinds?  Are these proposed causal agents different primarily in their domain of 
application (e.g., vital force for biological kinds and fuel for artifacts) but  analogous in other 
ways (e.g., causal mechanisms for how they affect entities in their domain of application)?  
Perhaps, more importantly, none of the proposed causal principles offers any explicit causal 
mechanisms.  What might the causal chain of events look like?  How do the proposed causal 
agents such as “vital force,” “function,” “essence,” or “innards” work? (see also Au, 1994; Au & 
Romo, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, in press). 
 
DO ADULTS READILY CONSTRUCT UNIQUELY BIOLOGICAL CAUSAL 
MECHANISMS? 
 One way to study folkbiology is to explore children’s beliefs about biological kinds and 
processes; another way is to study adults who have not received much or any science education.  
We have just begun to read about studies using the latter approach, so our knowledge in this area 
is bound to be patchy and limited.  Our initial impression is that published reports of such studies 
tended to focus on causal agents and/or input-output causal relations rather than causal 
mechanisms.  In the domain of illness, for instance, Nichter and Nichter (1994) reported that 
mothers in a rural area in the Philippines linked most respiratory conditions to sudden changes 
body temperature due to sun, rain, wind, bathing, and so on.  A study of Latino adults’ beliefs 
about empacho (roughly means “blocked digestion”) revealed that it generally believed to be 
caused by “a bolus of food that sticks to the wall of the intestine, usually as a result of dietary 
indiscretion or swallowing a lot of saliva” (Weller, Pachter, Trotter, & Baer, 1993).  Some 
African communities were reported to believe that diarrhea can be caused by:  Teething, 
intestinal worms, eating bad food, drinking too much water, ingesting dirt, being touched by a 
father who has just committed adultery, worrying too much, being hit on the buttocks, and so 
forth (Green, Jurg, & Djedje, 1994; Yoder, 1995).  See D’Andrade (1976) and Murdock (1980) 
for additional examples of studies focusing on causal agents and input-output causal relations 
rather than causal mechanisms. 
 
It is perhaps no accident that people across cultures have rich beliefs about what might 
cause a person to have certain illness symptoms, what effect a treatment might have, and so 
forth.  Such beliefs about input-output relations in the domain of illness—if roughly on the right 
track—can be very useful in illness prevention and treatment (see e.g., Berlin & Berlin, 1996).  
Beliefs about causal mechanisms of illness (or other biological phenomena for that matter), by 
contrast, seem more like a luxury than a necessity in everyday life.  For example,  
the belief “smoking can cause lung cancer” could save lives if people act on this belief sensibly, 
with or without understanding any causal mechanism for how smoking might cause lung cancer.  
Lack of ecological significance, then, might be why causal mechanisms for biological 
phenomena are much less thought about in everyday life and much less documented in 
anthropological studies.  Nonetheless, we did come across some published narratives revealing 
the informants’ beliefs about causal mechanisms for specific illness.  
 
GASTROINTESTINAL PROBLEMS 
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 Consider this narrative collected in El Salvador:  
“In the stomach, food is cooked (se cuecen los alimentos) and therefore the stomach has to 
stay warm.  When the climate turns cool, the stomach gets cold, letting food leave the 
stomach undigested.  If you eat food with cold properties during the cold season you can also 
get stomach problems.  Food which is considered cold, even though heated in the fire, always 
maintains this property.  Tamales, beef or pork consommé and chicken soup are all 
considered cold food.  In addition to these foods cucumbers and tomatoes are cool.  The 
outside surface of the bean sticks in the stomach and for this reason it is not recommended to 
give children beans at nighttime, because the night is cold and the food is cold, thereby 
making the child sick”  (Bonilla, Alferez de Castilo, & Piñeda, 1987; translated by and 
quoted in Kendall, 1990, pp. 183-184). 
 
 Temperature (i.e., hot, cold) and adhesiveness (e.g., the cold surface of bean sticking in 
the stomach) figure prominently in this account of causal chain of events that can lead to 
stomach problems.  Note that temperature and adhesiveness are mechanical/physical rather than 
biochemical properties of substances.  Similarly, naive mechanics also seems to be recruited by 
Latino adults to explain the symptoms of empacho.  This illness is characterized by a cluster of 
symptoms including stomach aches and bloating, vomiting, cramps, diarrhea, constipation, and 
lack of appetite (Weller et al., 1993).  As noted earlier, it is generally believed to be caused by a 
blockage of food in the stomach or intestines.  For many Mexican-Americans, the recommended 
treatments include:  Stomach massages, rolling an egg on the stomach, and popping the skin on 
the small of the back to dislodge the food blockage; drinking olive oil or herbal teas to loosen the 
food (Trotter, 1985).  In this case, mechanical causal devices rather than uniquely biological 
causal devices are invoked when the informants tried to specify the causal chain of events that 
can lead to these symptoms and how the recommended treatments work to relieve the symptoms. 
 
 A third example of invoking mechanical causality in reasoning about treatment for 
gastrointestinal illness can be found among indigenous healers in Mozambique.  When 
traditional African medicine fails to cure a child’s diarrhea, indigenous healers consider “the 
child being without water” to be the cause of symptoms such as white eyes, edema in limbs, loss 
of appetite, loss of skin elasticity, general weakness, and thirst.  The mechanical path of how 
water gets into the child is believed to matter a great deal.  For instance, some healers noted that 
they can give a child water, but this will not do because the water will just swell up his stomach.  
Instead, “the child must be taken to a hospital quickly, where doctors ‘will put water’ (or 
‘blood’) into the child by a needle in the arm” (p. 16, Green et al., 1994). 
 
 
 
BREAST CANCER 
 In a study of 26 African-American women in rural North Carolina with advanced breast 
cancer, 62% of these women seemed to believe that their cancerous lumps were triggered by a 
bump or blow to the body which causes some impurities in the blood to clump together in one 
place  (Mathews, Lannin, & Mitchell, 1994).  Here are some examples of how these women 
talked about the cause of their breast cancer (p. 793): 
May:  “ I noticed a knot in my breast in 1989, but it didn’t hurt.  It just came from bumping 
into the bed so I put it out of my mind.” 
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Jean:  “I had a sore spot on my breast that came from bumping into the car door with my 
groceries.  A lump came up there but it never bothered me.” 
Clara:  “I had a pain in my arm for five years....I also had a knot in my breast all that time, 
but it would come and go....But then I noticed a few months ago that there was a big knot on 
my right breast where Mr. Jones (an Alzheimer’s patient she sits for) had been hitting me on 
the side.  You know, if you get a hard enough blow, it makes some kind of blood clot, and if 
it stays there long enough it’s going to form something else.” 
Lucille:  “That knot I had came and went.  If you have dirty blood, the impurities have to go 
somewhere.  And once I passed the change (i.e., menopause), that blood just stayed in me all 
the time.  It was mounting up.  When I fell down that day in the garden, they all came up to 
that bruise and they made a lump.  That’s what made it so big.” 
 
 More generally, our glimpse of the medical anthropology literature suggests that while 
people can often come up with reasonable lists of causes, symptoms, and recommended 
treatments for various salient illnesses in their communities, their repertoire does not seem to 
include biological causal mechanisms for how specific causes can lead to specific symptoms or 
how specific treatments work.  When they do manage to talk about causal mechanisms linking 
the causes and treatments to symptoms, they often fall back on their naive mechanics (e.g., 
temperature and stickiness of food, mechanical blows on the body).  Even when they attribute an 
illness to moral transgression (e.g., a child’s diarrhea caused by the child’s father’s adultery) or 
negligence (e.g., a child’s diarrhea caused by the child’s mother stepping into milk expressed 
from a woman who has had a miscarriage), mechanic transfer of contaminants or impurities is 
often implicated (e.g., the adulterous father touching the child; the careless mother nursing the 
child).  When mechanical causality is not recruited to fill in specific causal chains of events for 
natural or supernatural causation of illness, typically little else is offered in terms of explicit 
causal mechanisms (see e.g., Murdock, 1980). 
 
MECHANICAL CAUSALITY IN CHILDREN’S “FOLKBIOLOGY” 
 To date, only a few studies have explicitly examined children’s beliefs about causal 
mechanisms for biological phenomena.  In one study, Inagaki and Hatano (1993) compared 
children's preference for intentional, vitalistic, and mechanical causal explanations for biological 
phenomena.  They asked children, for instance, why we eat food everyday.  Children were asked 
to choose among three explanations: "Because we want to eat tasty food" (intentional); "Because 
our stomach takes in vital power from the food" (vitalistic); "Because we take the food into our 
body after its form is changed in the stomach and bowels" (mechanical).  Likewise, when asked 
why we take in air, children were asked to choose from: "Because we want to feel good" 
(intentional); "Because our chest takes in vital power from the air" (vitalistic); "Because the 
lungs take in oxygen and change it into useless carbon dioxide" (mechanical).  In this study, 6-
year-olds chose vitalistic explanations as most plausible most often (54% of the time).  Eight-
year-olds chose vitalistic explanations only 34% of the time; they generally preferred mechanical 
explanations (62%).  Adults overwhelmingly preferred mechanical explanations (96%). 
 
 Springer and Keil (1991) also found that 6- and 7-year-olds favored mechanical causality 
over other kinds of causal mechanisms (e.g., genetic, intentional) in explaining why, for instance, 
how a baby flower may get its blue color or how a puppy may get its brown fur color.  Children 
in this study were offered three kinds of possible explanations:  Intentional, mechanical, and 
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genetic.  One example:  "The mother flower wanted her baby to be blue just like her.  Because 
she wanted the baby to be blue, she gave it some very tiny things that went into the seed and 
turned the baby flower blue" (intentional); "Some very tiny blue pieces went from the mother to 
the baby flower.  These tiny blue pieces went into the seed and got all over the baby flower.  
Because they got into the baby flower's petals, the baby flower turned blue" (mechanical); "Some 
very tiny colorless things went from the mother to the baby flower.  These tiny things put the 
blue color together in the baby flower.  Even though these tiny things aren't any color, they could 
make the baby flower blue" (genetic).  The mechanical account (or what Springer and Keil called 
the "gemmulic account") was judged best by the 6-year-olds nearly 80% of the time.  An 
important difference between the winner and the losers is that the mechanical account specifies a 
simple mechanical transfer of color pigment, whereas the genetic and the intentional accounts 
did not. 
 
 Together, these studies suggest that mechanical causality is the mechanism of choice 
during middle childhood for explaining biological phenomena.  Our quick survey of medical 
anthropological studies also hints at adults’ reliance on mechanical causality when pressed to 
speculate on specific chains of causal events inside the human body--if scientific accounts are 
not in the adults’ repertoire.  One caveat:  In Inagaki and Hatano’s (1993) and Springer and 
Keil’s (1991) studies, children were asked to choose among several possible mechanisms, rather 
than to generate one on their own.  As Carey (1995) pointed out, it is very difficult to make 
different explanation types comparable with respect to the informativeness of the explanation 
and familiarity with the information it contains.  So, when children chose one type of explanation 
over another, it is not always clear why they did so. 
 
 Nonetheless, we suspect that mechanical causality is the mechanism of choice for 
children and adults--especially those without the benefit of science education--in their attempts 
to make sense of biological phenomena.  For one thing, from infancy on, children know and 
rapidly learn quite a lot about how objects and substances behave in terms of mechanics.  Their 
naive mechanics allows them to appreciate that physical entities will move according to 
principles such as cohesion, solidity, contact, and continuity (e.g., Carey & Spelke, 1994; Spelke 
& Hermer, 1996; Wellman & Gelman, 1992, in press).  Although children and even adults make 
erroneous predictions about the dynamics of more complex systems (e.g., wheels and pulleys), 
they are generally quite good at reasoning about whether an object or a portion of substance will 
stay put or be set in motion, how it will move (as long as the entity can be thought of as a single 
particle of mass), and so forth (e.g., McCloskey, 1983; Proffitt, Kaiser, & Whelan, 1990).  So, 
before children and adults understand any uniquely biological mechanisms, it makes sense for 
them to apply their naive mechanics--a rather well worked-out foundational theory--to reason 
about living things as well as nonliving things.  Indeed, as discussed earlier, adults from different 
cultures seem to recruit their naive mechanics to explain causal links between causes, symptoms, 
and treatments of illness. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSALITY:  ANOTHER CONTENDER 
 Another obvious source for causal mechanisms at children’s disposal, as Carey (1985, 
1991, 1995) pointed out, is naive psychology.  But by age six or so, as discussed earlier, children 
can grasp the conceptual distinction between biological and nonbiological kinds and that 
between biological and psychological processes.  They recognize that bodily processes and 
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psychological processes tend to be modified by different means.  From that point on, it is 
unlikely that children confuse folkbiology with folk psychology.  So, when they offer a socio-
psychological explanation for a biological phenomenon (e.g., John has a cold today because 
yesterday he played with Mary, who kept coughing and sneezing while playing with him), it 
does not necessarily mean that psychological causality is the only game in town.  At a different 
level of analysis, children could be thinking about Mary passing some of her cold germs to John 
when she accidentally sneezed or coughed at him.  In other words, children’s use of socio-
psychological explanations for biological phenomena cannot by itself be taken as prima facie 
evidence for children confusing folk psychology with folkbiology. 
 
 What about children under age six?  If children have to stretch either their naive 
psychology or naive mechanics to reason about biological processes, it seems plausible that they 
would opt for naive mechanics.  For one thing, even preschoolers can distinguish mental and 
physical entities (e.g., a cookie in a dream vs. a cookie in real life) and processes (e.g., thinking 
about eating a cookie vs. actually eating a cookie; Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Estes, 1986).  
Note that, like mechanical processes, most biological processes (e.g., growth, healing, 
reproduction) act on physical rather than metaphysical matter.  By contrast, psychological 
processes typically affect thoughts, feelings, and at times behaviors.  So, before children 
understand any causal mechanisms that are uniquely biological, it seems more natural for them 
to stretch their naive mechanics rather than naive psychology to explain biological phenomena. 
 
IN CHILDREN’S OWN WORDS 
 Earlier, we have offered some suggestive evidence that, without the benefit of science 
education, adults in different cultures invoke mechanical causality to explain the causes, 
symptoms, and treatments of illness.  Inagaki and Hatano’s (1993) and Springer and Keil’s 
(1991) studies also suggest that mechanical causality is the mechanism of choice during middle 
childhood for explaining biological phenomena.  But children in these two studies did not have 
to generate their own explanations; they were asked to choose among several possible 
mechanisms.  Given the methodological concern raised by Carey (1995), namely the 
comparability of different explanations types for extraneous factors, it would be helpful to hear 
what kinds of explanations children can come up with on their own. 
 
 
 
A Case Study 
 Reproduction.  We have been following one child’s quest for biological knowledge for 
some time.  The first report was filed in 1996 (by Au and Romo, p. 210): 
A child we know asked, at age 2 years 9 months, where she was when her mother planted the 
orange tree in their backyard and was told that she was in her mother's tummy.  She then 
wanted to know where she was when her mother planted the lemon tree in their front yard.  
The mother said, "You weren't even in my tummy yet."  The child was visibly upset about 
her non-existence once upon a time.  The mother relented and explained, "Half of you was in 
my tummy; the other half, in Daddy's tummy."  The child went away happy but came back in 
a few minutes to ask, "Were my feet in Daddy's tummy?"  The mother was determined to 
help the child supplant this mechanical explanation with a proper one, namely, a biological 
one.  She explained that the two halves did not have arms and legs; instead each half was like 
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a little egg (without the shell, she emphasized); the two little eggs mixed together and then 
grew into a baby.  The toddler nodded and talked about this matter-of-factly a few times in 
the ensuing weeks.  Her mother was pleased with the progress until the child asked one day, 
"How did I get into your tummy?  Did Dr. Wilkinson cut open your tummy to put me 
inside?" 
 
 The notion of procreation is difficult to grasp.  How can the concept of object 
permanence--at the core of naive mechanics--be reconciled with the transition from nonexistence 
to existence in reproduction of biological kinds?  This child in this case went with her intuitions 
about mechanical causality.  Understanding such a transition can be difficult even for adults.  
Just think about how intellectually unsatisfying the notion of “spontaneous generation” is for 
explaining generation of bacteria and fungi from apparently nothing.  One could almost imagine 
the scientific community’s collective sigh of relief in 1862 when Pasteur finally managed to 
show experimentally that micro-organisms came only from other micro-organisms; that a 
completely sterile solution will remain so unless contaminated by some micro-organisms (e.g., 
Pruves, Orians, & Heller, 1992).  Consider also the Biblical account for the origin of the human 
species.  To create Adam, God took some dust from the ground and shaped it into a human 
figure.  To effect the nonbiological to biological transformation, God then breathed into it life 
and created a man.  To create Eve, a rib was taken from Adam and transformed into a woman.  
In this account, biological beings were created by transforming physical matter (i.e., dust, air in a 
breath, rib bone) rather than by spontaneous generation of some sort.  These two events--one in 
the history of science and the other in religion--are so different and yet so alike.  They both 
illustrate people’s tenacious hold onto their naive mechanics and their reluctance to cross the 
ontological boundary of physical and metaphysical matter in tracing the history of an individual 
entity. 
 
 Illness.  We revisited the child a few days after she had celebrated her fourth birthday.  
By then, according to diary records kept by the mother of the child’s speech, this 4-year-old 
seemed to know quite a lot about germs, infections, and relevant treatments.  For instance, she 
often talked about good germs that can be used for making yogurt and bread, and bad germs that 
can get into people’s bodies to make them sick.  She knew that germs need nutrients in order to 
multiply (by splitting themselves into baby germs).  She knew that soap can help wash germs off 
people’s hands and bodies; that brushing one’s teeth with toothpaste can help wash germs off the 
teeth.  She knew that there are different kinds of bad germs.  For instance, at age 3 years 9 
months, her mother explained to her that the Los Angeles Zoo decided to give up its penguin 
exhibit and moved it to another zoo because the penguins kept getting sick, perhaps because Los 
Angeles is too warm for penguins.  The child asked, “Is it because the germs that make penguins 
sick are different from the germs that make people sick?”  The mother asked, “Why do you think 
so?”  The child explained, “Because people get sick when it’s too cold; penguins get sick it’s too 
warm!”   
 
 This child also knew that some medicine can kill certain kinds of germs but not others.  
For instance, when she was told that her eyes seemed pink one morning, she asked, “Are my 
eyes crusty too?  Do you have to give me the eye-drops?” (age 3 years 10 months).  As it turned 
out, her mother had explained to her during her previous episode of conjunctivitis that the 
medicine in the eye-drops could kill only the kind of germ that causes pink and crusty eyes; that 
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it could not kill the kind of germ that causes only pink but not crusty eyes.  This distinction 
between bacterial and viral infection was of great interest to her because she hated eye-drops. 
 
 Her knowledge of germs, infections, and germ-killing medicine seems to have behavioral 
consequences.  At age 3 years 10 months, when her pink eyes turned out to be also crusty, her 
mother had a hard time (as usual) convincing her to cooperate with the administration of the eye-
drops.  Until the mother offered the following explanation, that is.  She explained, “This 
morning, you let me put some eye-drops in your eyes.  The medicine killed some of the germs, 
and your eyes are now less pink and crusty.  But there are still germs in your eyes.  If you don’t 
kill the rest with more eye-drops, the germs will split into more baby germs, and they will make 
your eyes pinker and more crusty again.”  This explanation seemed to be effective enough to get 
the child lie still for the mother to administer the eye-drops, although not enough to stop the child 
from cringing in anticipation of the pain inflicted by the eye-drops.  This child’s knowledge of 
germs and illness also seems to be useful in other ways.  For instance, she is very good about 
brushing her teeth twice a day and washing her hands before meals.  When she discovered that 
someone she knew brushed his teeth only before at bedtime, she told him, “You should brush 
your teeth in the morning too.  When you brush you teeth at night, you can’t brush all the bad 
germs and food off.  The bad germs can split into baby germs when you sleep.  So, there will be 
lots of germs in you teeth in the morning!” (age 3 year 11 months). 
 
 Her knowledge of germs inside the human body also seemed quite sophisticated.  For 
instance, when she scraped her knees or had some other minor wounds, she often talked about 
the pink and slightly swollen area around the wound,  She would explain to whoever might be 
interested that there were still bad germs in the wound; that white blood cells were needed to kill 
the germs; that the wounded area was pink and swollen because the body had to let more blood--
which carried white blood cells--to go there.  In short, this child seemed to understand some 
biological mechanisms in this domain.  Briefly, she seemed to know that germs are biological 
kinds that can live and die; that different germs can thrive in different conditions (e.g., penguin 
germs in warm weather; human germs in cold weather); that germs can reproduce by dividing 
into baby germs;  that germs need nutrients for survival and reproduction; that germs can be 
killed by medicine and white blood cells; that dead germs are harmless....  This set of beliefs 
allowed her to reason about the causes, treatments, and symptoms of infections quite coherently 
and sensibly. 
 
 We want to make two points with this case study.  First, Understanding and making use 
of biological causal mechanisms for reasoning about biological phenomena are possible even 
during the preschool years, if appropriate input from adults is available.  So, for most children, 
the relatively late emergence of an autonomous biology--compared to naive mechanics--may 
have to do with the timing of input from science education rather than some domain-general 
cognitive limitations that prevent children from understanding simple biological causal 
mechanisms. 
 
 This brings us to the second point.  Namely, the input for developing an understanding of 
uniquely biological causal mechanisms is probably not available to most children in their 
everyday life.  In fact, we would venture as far as suggesting that an understanding of biological 
causal mechanisms is a luxury rather than a necessity during early and middle childhood.  
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Children can do quite well in predicting biological phenomena by learning about causal agents 
and input-output relations.  When pressed to be explicit about the causal chain of events between 
the input and output, they can always fall back on mechanical causality.  A case in point:  The 4-
year-old in this case study once explained to her mother why she could not sit up straight in a 
restaurant.  (The child and her father had just picked up the mother from the airport.)  She 
explained, “When you were in Washington, D.C. at your meeting, I started coughing and having 
a runny nose.  Now there are so many germs moving this way and that way!  They keep pushing 
me this way and that way, so I can’t sit still.”  She then plopped down on her mother’s lap. 
 
How School-Age Children Explain the “Incubation of Germs” Phenomenon 
 We (Au & Romo, 1996) asked 35 8- and 9-year-olds, "There are a few germs on a piece 
of fish inside a plastic bag.  What will happen in a couple of days?  Will there be more germs, 
fewer germs, or the same number of germs?  Why?"  About 26% of the children explained their 
predictions about the number of germs by invoking mechanical causality.  Some examples are: 
"Same number of germs--because no germs can get through the plastic;" "More germs--because 
the fish will get more germs from the plain plastic bag.  There might be dirt in that bag."  About 
17% correctly explained that there would be more germs because the germs would divide or 
multiply. 
 
 We also asked these children to consider, "Some bad germs got inside a kid's body.  She 
felt okay for a day.  But then the next day she started to feel sick all over her whole body.  Why 
did it take a whole day for her to feel sick after the germs got inside her body?"  Most of the 
children failed to give any meaningful explanation.  But 34% of them did explain either that it 
took time for enough germs to get inside the girl's body or that it took time for the germs to get to 
different parts of the girl's body.  Only 6% of them explained that it took time for the germs to 
multiply/reproduce inside the girl's body.  There seemed, then, to be considerable interest in the 
paths traversed by the cold germs (i.e., getting into the body, going to different parts of the girl’s 
body) and the time required by such traveling.  Our findings about food spoilage and contagion 
are consistent with Springer and Belk’s (1994) finding that some preschoolers and most 7- and 8-
year-olds recognized the need for physical contact between a contaminant-carrying bug and food 
for the food to become contaminated.  That is, most school-age children seem to believe that the 
mechanical paths traced by germs and/or contaminants are crucial for predicting whether 
contagion/ contamination will occur. 
 
How School-Age Children Explain HIV Transmission 
 In assessing an experimental AIDS curriculum for fourth to eighth grade children, we 
asked children to explain their judgments of AIDS risk in the novel situations (Au & Romo, 
1996).  The experimental curriculum focused on a biological causal mechanism of HIV 
transmission, and so we expected that it would get children to mention the biology of HIV more 
than an existing curriculum would.  We divided children’s explanations into these four 
categories: 
(1) Mentioning the biology of HIV (die, survive, or reproduce) 
E.g., "I said no because the saliva on the toothbrush bristles connected with air, so the AIDS 
in the saliva are dead;" "No, because it dies in the water.  We always rinse with water and it 
[HIV on a toothbrush] dies;" "No, because AIDS can die in water." 
(2) Mentioning the mechanical path traversed by the HIV 
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E.g., "Because if you wipe a person who has a bloody nose and you have a cut on your hand, 
the infected blood can get into you;" "The AIDS virus can get from the needle to the other 
person." 
(3) Mentioning the media (substances surrounding the HIV) 
E.g., "No, because there is no blood involved;" "Yes, because you can only get AIDS through 
blood." 
(4) No or irrelevant/uninformative explanation 
E.g., "I said no because you can't get AIDS by tattooing anywhere, maybe something else." 
 
 About 46% of the explanations invoked mechanical causality to talk about the path 
traversed by the AIDS virus.  Only 17% mentioned the biology of the AIDS virus; only 11% 
mentioned just the media of the virus.  The remaining 26% were “I don’t know” or irrelevant 
explanations.  Interestingly, children's tendency to offer a mechanical causal explanation did not 
vary much across grades or conditions (experimental vs. existing curriculum), even though the 
experimental curriculum succeeded in getting children to give biological explanations more 
often.  These findings suggest that the tendency to invoke mechanical causality to explain AIDS-
-and perhaps more generally infection--transmission is rather robust during middle childhood 
and early adolescence. 
 
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
 In this section, we have heard from children directly how they explained various 
biological phenomena.  Mechanical causality was often invoked in their explanations.  This 
finding is in line with the suggestive evidence that school-age children tend to choose, in forced-
choice tasks, mechanical causal explanations over other kinds of explanations (e.g., genetic, 
intentional, or vitalistic) for biological phenomena (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Springer & Keil, 
1991).  Despite young children’s rather impressive knowledge about biological kinds, then, we 
need to be cautious in attributing the status of an autonomous theory to such knowledge structure 
(see also Atran, 1994, 1995; Carey, 1995; Solomon et al., 1996).  We need to know what its 
domain-specific causal devices and mechanisms might look like.  That was what we tried to find 
out in the two studies to be reported here. 
 
STUDY 1: CHILDREN’S EXPLANATIONS FOR ILLNESS, FOOD SPOILAGE, DEATH, 
INHERITANCE 
 How robust is children’s tendency to invoke mechanic causality in explaining biological 
phenomena?  While our case study and the two larger studies just summarized suggest that 
children from a wide age range (age 3 to age 14) stretch their naive mechanics into the domain of 
biology, it is obvious that we need more comprehensive evidence.  In this study, we set out to 
listen to more children talking about more biological phenomena. 
 
METHOD 
Subjects 
 105 children (48 boys, 57 girls) in kindergarten through sixth grade were interviewed at 
their school, which was a parochial school serving primarily a low-income, Latino community in 
East Los Angeles.  We chose this school because we were interested children’s intuitive 
explanations for illness causation, food spoilage, death, and genetic inheritance.  Two teachers at 
the school told us that the children had received very little, if any, health instruction either at 
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home or school, and that the school was in the process of developing a health education program.  
The sample size and mean age (and age ranges) in each grade were:  22 kindergartners, 5;8 (i.e., 
5 years 8 months, ranging from 5;1 to 6;5), 14 first graders, 6;6 (6;2 to 7;2), 18 second graders, 
7;6 (7;0 to 8;8), 15 third graders, 8;7 (8;2 to 9;2), 16 fourth graders, 9;7 (9;2 to 10;6), 10 fifth 
graders, 10;8 (10;5 to 11;7), 10 sixth graders, 11;7 (11;2 to 12;2). 
 
Procedure 
 Children were interviewed individually in a quiet corner of their school.  Each interview 
lasted about 10-15 minutes and was audiotaped and later transcribed.  During the interview, an 
experimenter showed a child colored drawings depicting four stories (illness, food spoilage, 
death, inheritance).  For each story, the experimenter narrated the picture(s) according to a well-
rehearsed script and then asked a set of yes/no and open-ended questions about the story.  The 
order of the stories was randomized and counterbalanced across children. 
 
 To create a comfortable atmosphere for the younger children, we sat next to the children 
to share a “picture book” (i.e., our stimulus book).  To keep children interested in this book-
reading task, some of the pictures included pop-up details (e.g., lifting a paper hat off a baby's 
head to examine her hair color, opening a freezer door to look inside).  All children were 
interviewed according to the same protocol and using the same stimulus book. 
 We always followed up our yes/no questions with open-ended ones (e.g., “Why do you 
think that happened?”).  To encourage children to tell us more, we probed for additional 
information after each explanation offered by a child (e.g., “That's interesting.  Can you explain a 
little more about how that works?”).  We probed only as long as each child had new information 
to offer.  So, when children repeated a previous response, said that they had finished answering 
or didn't know the answer to the question, or changed the topic of the question, we moved on to 
the next question in the story or to the next story. 
 All interviews were transcribed and then coded according to the coding systems to be 
described presently.  Because the questions and coding systems vary considerably from story to 
story, we will present the stimulus stories, questions, coding systems, and results one story at a 
time. 
 
ILLNESS 
Story and Questions 
 Scene 1:  (a smiling boy talking to a girl holding a handkerchief to her face):  “This is a 
picture of John and this is Mary.  John is visiting Mary today.  But poor Mary had a cold.  She 
was sneezing and sneezing, and some bad germs got into John's body.  But John felt fine, and 
they played for a little while, and then he went home.” 
 
 Scene 2:  (John holding his hand to his throat looking unhappy):  “The next day when 
John woke up, he had a sore throat!  Now remember when John was playing with Mary?  Some 
bad germs got into his body, yet he felt fine.  But the next day, he woke up with a sore throat.  
Why do you think that happened?  Why did it take a whole day for John to get a sore 
throat?” 
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 Scene 3:  (John lying in bed looking miserable):  “That night, John felt worse.  Not only 
did his throat hurt, but now his ears hurt, his head hurt, and his whole body felt tired all over.  
Why do you think that happened?  Why did John feel sick all over?” 
 
Coding System 
(1) “Biology” of Germs or White Blood Cells (including biological processes or animate 
functions such as growing, dying, reproducing, fighting, eating) 
E.g., “The germs are growing and growing and making him more sick;” “It takes time for the 
cells to die off when bacteria strikes;” “Maybe the virus gets into one of his cells, and the cells 
keep reproducing, and then he will get more germs;” “The germs needed time to travel when 
they fight with your white blood cells, and then take effect.” 
(2) Explicit Mechanical Transfer of Germs 
E.g.,  “Germs spread all over his body;” “The germs went into his throat;” “Germs settle in;” 
“Germs barely got in;” “It takes a while for the germs to get there." 
(3) Explicit Movement of Unspecified Entities (e.g., sickness, cough, sneeze, it, they) 
E.g.,  “He got sick because it went into his neck;” “The sneeze little by little came in through 
his body;” “The cough went all through his body and made him sick.” 
(4) Only People’s Behaviors or Characteristics 
E.g., “Mary sneezed on him;” “When he was talking to Mary, it got all over him;” “Mary was 
sneezing/ had a cold/ wasn’t feeling well;” “John was talking to/ visiting Mary;” “John was 
playing and talking too much/ didn't rest/ didn't take medicine/ didn’t wear a jacket/ went 
outside too long;” “The body gets weaker and weaker;” “He might have been healthy enough 
that it, well, because it takes time for colds and other sorts of sicknesses to take over your 
immune system;” “He did not feel he had the germs....and then in the morning, he realized that 
he was cold and he got sick.” 
(5) Other/Irrelevant/ Uninformative/Other/No Explanations 
 
 Category 1 (biology) supersedes Category 2 (explicit mechanical transfer), which 
supersedes Category 3 (movement of unspecified entities), which in turn supersedes Category 4 
(people).  This coding system was applied to both questions: “Why did it take a whole day (or, in 
Study 2, “so much time”) for John to get a sore throat?" and “Why did John feel sick all over (or, 
in Study 2, “in so many parts of his body”)?”  Responses from all of the children in this and the 
next study were coded by the same coder.  A second coder went over 33% (85 out of the 260 
children in these two studies combined) of the responses independently for the first question and 
38% of the responses for the second question.  The two coders agreed on 92% and 91%  of the 
cases respectively (Cohen’s Kappas = 0.89 and 0.86). 
 
Results 
 Only 6% of the 105 children in this study talked about the “biology” of germs or white 
blood cells (dying, growing bigger/stronger, breeding, fighting, eating) when they tried to 
explain “Why did it take a whole day for John to get a sore throat?"  Only 4% of the children did 
so when they tried to explain “Why did John feel sick all over?”  This tiny minority of children 
came from second through sixth grade classes (i.e., age seven and older). 
 
 By contrast, 35% of the children invoked mechanical transfer of germs to explain why it 
took a whole day for John to get a sore throat (e.g.,  “The germs went into his throat;” “It takes a 
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while for the germs to get there”), and 42% did so to explain why John felt sick all over (e.g., 
“Germs spread all over his body”).  This kind of explanation accounts for a majority of the older 
children’s responses: 63% (fourth grade), 70% (fifth grade), 80% (sixth grade). 
 
 Many children--especially the younger ones--did not go much beyond talking about 
people’s behaviors (e.g., “Mary was sneezing on him;” “John was talking to Mary”) or 
characteristics (e.g., “the body gets weaker and weaker”).  Overall, 30% of the children gave this 
kind of “people” explanations for the “took a whole day” question and 39% did so for the “sick 
all over” question.  Such explanation talked about pertinent input-output relations at best; they 
did not offer any causal mechanism for the incubation period of infectious diseases.  Table 1 
summarizes the results on illness. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
FOOD SPOILAGE 
Story and Questions 
 Scene 1: (a family gathering around the kitchen table, with parents wrapping up food in 
foil):  "This is a picture of Karla and this is her family.  They had fish for dinner tonight.  Karla's 
mother and father are wrapping up the leftover fish.  They wrapped the fish up tightly in foil, and 
put it in the freezer." 
 
 Scene 2:  (kitchen scene, a covered plate is on the table and a covered plate is in the 
freezer):  "The next day, when Karla went to the freezer, she saw the wrapped fish.  But look--
some wrapped fish was left on the table!  It was left there all night long.  Do you think this fish 
has more germs than it did last night?  (if “Yes,”) How did more germs get on the fish?  (if 
“No,”) Why not?"  (experimenter opening the freezer) "What about the fish in the freezer?  Do 
you think this fish has more germs than it did last night?  (if “Yes,”) How did more germs 
get on the fish?  (if “No,”) Why not?” 
 
Coding System 
(1) Biology of Germs 
E.g., “The germs can die because it’s very cold in the freezer;” “The germs will breed.” 
 
(2) Explicit Mechanical Transfer of Additional Germs 
E.g., “Bugs got in and spread germs onto the fish;” “Germs are everywhere and get on the 
fish;” “The freezer is closed/sealed so germs cannot get on the fish;” “This has been sitting 
out, and it’s been exposed to bacteria;” “Bacteria can flow through many places.  Like if 
there’s a broken plate, it can still flow in through the broken part.” 
 
(3) Implicit Mechanical Transfer of Germs:  Discussing a source of additional germs without 
spelling out the mechanical path. 
E.g., “The house is covered with germs and bacteria;” “They left it out on the table and 
outside there are germs;” “There is no germs in the cold and so it’s protected from germs;” 
“The freezer doesn’t have germs (and tables do).” 
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(4) Observable Events 
4a. Relevant to Mechanical Transfer of Additional Germs:  Mentioning possible sources or 
carriers of germs without using the term germ. 
E.g., “The table is dirty;” “It was in the freezer, and the freezer is closed;” “The freezer door 
doesn’t have holes;” “Nobody touched it, sneezed on it, or coughed on it;” “Bugs could land 
on it.” 
4b People’s Behaviors:  Discussing food storage, food contamination via saliva. 
E.g., “It was left it out on the table;” “They didn’t put it in the freezer;” “Karla’s family ate 
it and germs went onto the fish;” “It got rotten if you leave fish out.” 
4a. Macroscopic Description of the Fish 
E.g., “The fish stayed fresh;” “It’s in the freezer.  It’s keeping it not to be rotten.” 
 
(5) Other/Irrelevant/Uninformative/No Explanations 
  
In this coding system, Category 1 (biology) supersedes Category 2 (explicit mechanical transfer), 
which supersedes Category 3 (implicit mechanical transfer), which in turn supersedes Category 4 
(observable events).  Within Category 4, 4a supersedes 4b, which supersedes 4c.  This system 
was applied to responses given to “Do you think this fish has more germs than it did last night?  
(if “Yes,”) How did more germs get on the fish?  (if “No,”) Why not?” for both the fish in the 
freezer and the fish left out on the table.  Responses from all of the children in both Studies 1 and 
2 were coded by the same coder.  For the “fish on the table” question, a second coder went over 
41% (105 out of the 260 children in these two studies) of the data independently, and the two 
coders agreed on 94% of the cases (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.92).  For the “fish in the freezer” 
question, a second coder went over 38% of the data independently, and the two coders agreed on 
85% of the cases (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.81). 
 
Results 
 None of the children in this study, not even the sixth graders, invoked a biological causal 
mechanism to explain why there were more (or no more) germs in the fish after being left out on 
the table overnight.  When asked to explain why there were more (or no more) germs in the fish 
after being stored in the freezer overnight, only 5 of the 105 children in this study--one each in 
second, third, four, fifth, and sixth grade--talked about the biology of germs (e.g., the germs died 
in the freezer). 
 
 Most of the children talked about observable events: potential source of germs (e.g., “the 
table is dirty”), people’s behaviors (e.g., “they didn’t put it in the freezer”), or the fish (e.g., “The 
fish stayed fresh/ became soggy”).  These explanations reflect what children could readily 
observe in daily life:  the input-output relation of food storage practices and the subsequent 
condition of food.  By themselves, such explanations do not offer any causal mechanism for food 
spoilage or its prevention. 
 
 Of the 105 children, 26% did manage to offer explicit causal mechanisms for why the 
fish had more (or, for a small number of children, no more) germs after being left out on the 
table overnight.  All of them invoked mechanical causality:  “Bugs got in and spread germs onto 
the fish;” “Germs are everywhere and get on the fish;” “Germs couldn’t get in because the fish 
was wrapped;” and so forth.  To explain why the fish in the freezer had no more (or, for a small 
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number of children, more) germs after being stored there overnight, 32% of the 105 children 
offered an explicit causal mechanism.  As noted earlier, only 5% of the children invoked biology 
(e.g., death of germs).  The remaining 27% of the children invoked mechanics (e.g., “The freezer 
is closed/sealed so germs cannot get on the fish”).  Table 2 summarizes the results on food 
spoilage. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
DEATH 
Story and Questions 
 Picture of an insect:  “What is this?  That's right.  And when [child’s label for the insect 
in plural form, e.g., grasshoppers] are alive, we know that they can move, they can eat, and they 
can breathe.  Do you think a [child’s label, e.g., grasshopper] can live forever?  Why?” 
 
Coding System 
(1) Biological Processes without Causal Mechanism (e.g., life Span) 
E.g., “Part of cycle of life;” “Because you have to die sometimes;” “No one could live 
forever;” “Because everything has a time to die;” “It could get old.” 
(2) Mechanical Causes:  Discussing outside mechanical forces that could crush the insect. 
E.g., “If you step on it;” “Some animals could eat them;” “It got smashed.” 
(3) Other Observable Events without Explicitly Mentioning any Mechanical Cause of Death 
E.g., “It gets hurt;” “It can be killed;” “Eating poison food and eating poison things;” “Go in 
water;” “It has no food;” “It’s too hot or too cold;” “In winter when it’s snowing.” 
(4) Other/Irrelevant/Uninformative/No Explanations 
 
 Category 1 (biological processes) supersedes Category 2 (mechanical), which supersedes 
Category 3 (other observable events).  This coding system was applied to responses given to “Do 
you think a [child’s label, e.g., grasshopper] can live forever?  Why?”  Only explanations from 
children who had correctly said “no” to the yes/no question were coded.  Two coders 
independently went over all such explanations (altogether 224 explanations in Studies 1 and 2 
combined).  They agreed on 93% of the cases (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.90). 
 
 
Results 
 In this study, 25 (or 24%) of the 105 children incorrectly answered “yes” to the question, 
“Can grasshoppers/crickets/bugs live forever?”  Twelve of them were in kindergarten, 7 in first 
grade, 4 in second grade, and 2 in fourth grade.  This finding is reminiscent of our earlier finding 
that most children in a low-income Latino sample could not appropriately apply the attribute 
“will die someday” to plants and animals and not minerals and artifacts until age seven or so, 
lagging by about two years behind a university lab school sample (Au & Romo, 1996). 
 
 For the 80 children who answered “no,” the two most popular kinds of explanations for 
why an insect cannot live forever were:  life span (38%; e.g., “everything has a time to die”) and 
mechanical causes (30%; e.g., “if you step on it”).  As, shown in Table 3, explanations invoking 
life span became prevalent by second grade (about age seven).  The percentage of children in 
each grade giving this kind of explanation varied from 36% to 60% in second through sixth 
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grade.  From kindergarten on, explanations invoking mechanical causality had a substantial 
presence, ranging from 20% to 57% in each grade.  Most of the remaining children mentioned 
observable events that were not explicitly mechanical (e.g., “it has no food”).  Note that neither 
the explanations invoking life span nor those mentioning non-mechanical events offered any 
explicit causal mechanism.  Again, the only explanations that did so invoked mechanical 
causality. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
INHERITANCE 
Story and Questions 
 Scene 1:  (A black-haired woman holding a baby with a hat on):  "This is a picture of a 
baby and this is his mom.  What color hair do you think this baby has?  Why don't you check 
under the hat and see?  Yes, you were right--this baby has black hair just like his mother.” 
 
 Scene 2:  (A brown-haired woman holding a baby with a hat on):  "Here's another baby 
and this is her mom.  What color hair do you think this baby has?  Let's check under the hat and 
see.  Yes, you were right--this baby has brown hair just like her mother.  Why do you think that 
happened?  Why does this baby and her mom have the same hair color?” 
 
Coding System 
(1) Biology: Transfer of information through genes 
E.g., “The genes from the mother and the chromosomes mix with the father and give the 
genetic code of the what the baby’s going to look like.” 
(2) Explicit Mechanical Transfer of Substance to the Baby 
E.g., “The mother’s cells/genes/DNA/blood/food went into the baby;” “A piece of the 
mother’s hair fell onto the baby;” “Blood mixed together and went into the baby;” “The baby 
has the mother’s blood/genes;” “The mother painted or dyed the baby’s hair.” 
(3) Only Implicit Mechanical Transfer of Substance to the Baby:  Noting the mother-child 
proximity or connection during gestation/birth without explicitly mentioning transfer of 
substance. 
E.g., “The baby was in the mommy’s stomach;” “The baby was connected to the mother;” 
“The baby is a part of the mom;” “The baby was born from the mother;” “The baby came 
from the mother;” “They were a part of each other;” “The baby is part of the mother.” 
(4) Only Parent-Child Relations 
E.g., “Because it’s the mom’s baby;” “Because they are related/the same family;” “Because 
they live together;” “Mothers/Parents and babies are supposed to have the same hair color” 
“Black hair is passed down from generation to generation;” “The mom and dad made the 
baby;” “The dad got the mom pregnant;” “Because the mother and the baby are both girls;” 
“Because they are Filipino.” 
(5) Other/Irrelevant/Uninformative/No Explanations 
 
 Category 1 (biology) supersedes Category 2 (explicit mechanical transfer), which  
supersedes Category 3 (implicit mechanical transfer), which in turn supersedes Category 4 
(parent-child relations).  This coding system was applied to children’s explanations for “Why 
does this baby and her mom have the same hair color?”  Responses from all of the children in 
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both Studies 1 and 2 were coded by the same coder.  A second coder went over 44% (114 out of 
the 260 children in these two studies) of the data independently, and the two coders agreed on 
90% of the cases (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.87). 
 
Results 
 None of the children in this study, not even the sixth graders, invoked a biological causal 
mechanism to explain parent-child resemblance of hair color.  (The example used for illustrating 
this category in the coding system was actually taken from Study 2.)  While some children used 
scientific jargon such as genes, they only talked about parent-child relations and/or the 
mechanical transfer of genes without explaining how genes can determine hair color (i.e., by 
transfering information/instruction for making color pigment rather than by transfering color 
pigment itself).  For example, one explanation coded as “parent-child relations” was, “My 
brother got the same genes as my dad, and I got the same genes as my mom.”  An example for 
the “mechanical transfer of genes” was “It could be through their genes....The genes go into the 
baby’s body because they are from the same family.” 
 Virtually all of the children talked about family relations in explaining parent-child 
resemblance in hair color.  Some children did go beyond that to talked about an explicit causal 
mechanism, which was invariably mechanical in nature.  They talked about explicit mechanical 
transfer of substances such as blood, food, part of the mother’s body, mother’s hair, genes, stuff 
carried by sperms/eggs, and so forth.  Such explanations were prevalent among the third, fifth, 
and sixth (although not fourth) graders--ranging from 33% to 40% in each of these three grades 
(see Table 4). 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 Another popular explanation type had to do with the baby’s extreme proximity to the 
mother during gestation or birth (e.g., the baby was inside the mother/ came out of the mother).  
Even though such explanations did not talk about transfer of substance explicitly, they may have 
reflected beliefs about such transfer (e.g., food, blood, body stuff) from the mother to the baby.  
The percentage of children giving this kind of explanation for each grade (K - 6) ranged from 
18% to 50%, accounting for 30% of children’s responses in this study. 
 
CONCLUSIONS FROM STUDY 1 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings pertaining to four different 
biological phenomena:  illness, food spoilage, death, inheritance.  First, children very rarely, if at 
all, invoked uniquely biological causal mechanisms in their attempt to explain these phenomena.  
Those who did tended to come from the upper grades and to use scientific jargon--probably 
reflecting input from science classes rather than folk beliefs developed from everyday 
experience.  In other words, there is little evidence that kindergarteners or grade school children 
have any bona fide folkbiology--if inclusion of domain-specific causal mechanisms is to be 
considered crucial for any folk theory.  Second, as Carey (1985, 1991, 1995) would have 
predicted, many children talked about people’s behaviors, relations, characteristics.  Such 
explanations, at best however, were about input-output causal relations.  Such talk about people 
(and other observable events) generally offered no explicit causal mechanism for explaining the 
biological phenomena examined in this study.  Third, when children managed to offer explicit 
causal mechanisms, they almost always invoked mechanical causality (e.g., movement of germs 
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that can cause illness and food spoilage, mechanical forces that can cause death, transfer of 
substances that affect a baby’s hair color). 
 
STUDY 2:  A REPLICATION 
 The Children in Study 1 primarily came from low-income Latino families.  Study 2 
examined children’s beliefs in other socioeconomic and ethnic groups. 
 
METHOD 
Subjects 
 In one school serving primarily middle class families, 66 children (18 boys, 48 girls) 
were interviewed.  There were roughly 38% Anglo, 24% Filipino, and 20% Latino children; the 
remaining children came from other ethnic backgrounds.  The sample size and mean age (and 
age ranges) in each of these grades were:  21 first graders, 7;1 (6;6 to 8;3), 20 third graders, 9;1 
(8;7 to 9;10), and 25 fifth graders, 11;0, (10;7 to 12;5).  In another school, which serves primarily 
lower-middle class families, 89 children (41 boys, 48 girls) were interviewed.  The ethnic make-
up of the students was roughly 17% Anglo, 52% Filipino, and 31% Latino.  The sample size and 
mean age (and age ranges) in each of these grades were:  19 kindergartners, 5;8 (5;4 to 6;7), 22 
first graders, 6;9 (6;6 to 7;4), 19 third graders, 8;8 (8;3 to 9;3), 16 fifth graders, 10;8, (10;4 to 
11;4), and 13 seventh graders, 13;1 (12;6 to 13;4). 
 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as that of Study 1, except for some wording changes in the 
research protocol for the illness, food spoilage, and death stories.  (The protocol for the 
inheritance story remained unchanged.) 
 
 Illness.  In Study 1, some children did not talk about the incubation period even though 
we had asked them, “Why did it take a whole day for John to get a sore throat?"  Many of them 
seemed to treat our question as, “Why did John get a sore throat?”  In Study 2, we asked instead, 
“Why did it take so much time for John to get a sore throat?”  Also, in Study 1, we had asked, 
“Why did John feel sick all over?”  Again, some children seemed to ignore the “all over” part of 
the question.  In Study 2, we asked instead, “Remember here in the morning, he felt a little sick 
just in his throat.  But that night, John felt sick in many parts of his body.  So how do you think 
that happened?  Why did John feel sick in so many parts of his body?” 
 
 Food Spoilage.  In Study 1, we had asked, “Do you think this fish has more germs than it 
did last night?  (if “Yes,”) How did more germs get on the fish?  (if “No,”) Why not?"  Our 
probe for a “yes” answer may have biased children to talk about mechanical transfer of 
additional germs because of the wording in the probe (i.e.,. “get on”).  In Study 2, we asked 
instead, “Do you think this fish has more germs than it did last night? (yes/no)  Why do you 
think so?" 
 
 Death.  In Study 1, the questions “Do you think grasshopper/crickets/bugs (child’s label) 
can live forever?  Why?” did not elicit very much talk about possible causes of death.  In Study 
2, we added, “What are some ways a grasshopper/cricket/bug could die?”  
 
RESULTS 
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Illness 
 The main findings of Study 1 on illness were replicated with these two samples from 
more diverse ethnic and higher socioeconomic backgrounds.  That is, only a small number of 
children--mostly in the upper grade--talked about the biology of germs to explain the incubation 
period of an infectious disease and the spreading of symptoms to different parts of the body.  By 
contrast, a substantial number of children invoked mechanical causality to talk about the 
movement of germs when they tried to explain these phenomena.  The remaining children tended 
to talk only about what they can readily observe in daily life.  Table 5 summarizes the results on 
illness in this study. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Food Spoilage 
 The main findings of Study 1 on food spoilage were replicated in this study with one 
exception.  Namely, most of the 25 fifth graders in the school serving primarily middle-class 
families talked about the biology of germs (e.g., death, breeding) when they tried to explain why 
there would be more (or no more) germs on the fish.  About the fish that was left out on the table 
overnight, 72% of these fifth graders talked about a biological causal mechanism; about the fish 
that was stored in the freezer, 76% did so.  So, these children outperformed their peers and older 
children in the low-income sample of Study 1 (fifth and sixth graders) and those in the lower-
middle class sample of this study (fifth and seventh graders).  As it turned out, the fifth-graders 
in the middle-class sample had recently seen a film on germ multiplication and the environments 
(at various temperatures: body temperature, room temperature, hot and cold places) where germs 
can live and die.  Such school input was rare or entirely absent in the low-income sample, the 
lower-middle class sample, and in the first and third grade of this middle-class sample.  These 
findings are consistent with our speculation (noted earlier) that the relatively late emergence of 
an autonomous biology--compared to that of naive mechanics --may have much to do with the 
timing of science education input.  The results on food spoilage for this study are summarized in 
Table 6. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Death 
 In this study, ten of the 89 children (or 11%) from the lower-middle class sample and one 
of the 66 children (or 2%) in the middle class sample incorrectly answered “yes” to the question, 
“Can grasshoppers/crickets/bugs live forever?”  All but one of these children were in either 
kindergarten or first grade. 
 
 As in Study 1, for the children who answered “no,” the two most popular kinds of 
explanations for why an insect cannot live forever were:  life span (26% for the lower-middle 
class sample and 42% for the middle class sample) and  mechanical causes (30% and 52%, 
respectively for the two samples).  Most of the remaining children mentioned observable events 
that were not explicitly mechanical (e.g., “it has not food”).  Again, neither the explanations 
invoking life span nor those mentioning non-mechanical events offered any explicit causal 
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mechanism.  The only explanations that did so invoked mechanical causality.  Table  7 
summarizes the results on death for this study. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Inheritance 
 Only one child (a seventh grader in the middle-class school) among the 155 children in 
this study talked about the transfer of information about hair color from the mother to the baby: 
“The genes from the mother and the chromosomes mix with the father and give the genetic code 
of the what the baby’s going to look like.”  The use of jardon speaks clearly for the influence of 
science education; it certainly does not look like something spontaneously constructed by a child 
from everyday experience. 
 Most of the children’s explanations fell roughly equally often into one of these three 
categories: explicit mechanical transfer of substances (28% for the lower-middle class sample, 
N=89; 18% for the middle class sample, N=66), mother-child proximity during pregnancy or 
birth (26% and 30% respectively), and only parent-child relations (24% and 35% respectively).  
Again, when children explicitly talked about a causal mechanism for mother-child resemblance 
of hair color, they virtually always talked about mechanical transfer of substance such as blood, 
body parts, hair, and food.  Table 8 summarizes the results on inheritance for this study. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------- 
INDIVIDUAL CHILDREN’S RESPONSE PATTERNS 
 Do most children invoke mechanical causality to explain biological phenomena some of 
the time?  Or, do most of the “mechanical” explanations found in these two studies concentrated 
on the same group of children?  What about explanations invoking biological causal 
mechanisms?  What about explanations that focus on only people’s behaviors, characteristics, 
relations, or other observable events?  To address these questions, we computed the number of 
explanations in these three categories given by each child across biological phenomena. 
 
 Included as “biological causal mechanisms” are:  biology of germs for the illness and 
food spoilage stories, and transfer of information/instruction about hair color for the inheritance 
story.  (The death story is not included because no child offered any truly biological causal 
mechanism for that phenomenon.)  Table 9 presents the percentage of children in each grade, 
with Studies 1 and 2 combined, giving various numbers of explanations invoking a biological 
causal mechanism.  Overall, 80% of children gave no such explanation (N = 260).  Only from 
second grade on did some children manage to offer at least one such explanation (possible 
maximum = 5).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 Included as “mechanical causal mechanisms” are:  explicit mechanical transfer of germs 
for the illness and food spoilage stories, mechanical forces that can cause death, and mechanical 
transfer of substances from mother to baby.  In sharp contrast to the pattern of results for 
“biology” explanations, 77% of the children invoked mechanical causality at least once.  They 
gave anywhere from one to five such explanations (maximum = 6; see Table 9). 
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 Included as “Only people’s behaviors, characteristics, relations, and other observable 
events” are:  only people’s behaviors and characteristics for the illness story, only observable 
events for the food spoilage story, only observable events without explicit mention of mechanical 
forces for the death story, and only parent-child relations for the inheritance story.  Like 
mechanical causality, people’s behaviors and other observable events were invoked as the sole 
explanation for at least one biological phenomenon by 77% of the children.  These children gave 
anywhere from one to six such explanations (maximum = 6; see Table 9). 
 Taken together, these patterns of results suggest that most of children invoke mechanical 
causality to explain a biological phenomenon some of the time.  Most of the children also 
sometimes talk only about people’s behaviors and other observable events.  Finally, most 
children invoked no biological causal mechanism in these two studies. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 Now we feel that we have probably earned the privilege to put quotation marks around 
“folkbiology” in the title of this chapter.  Our case study of a preschool child’s quest for 
biological knowledge, our survey of folk explanations for illness and in medical anthropology 
research, our review of previous experimental studies of conceptual development in the domain 
of biology, and the two new studies reported here all converge to the same conclusions.  First, 
children and adults do not seem to construct uniquely biological causal mechanisms from their 
everyday experience.  If inclusion of domain-specific causal devices or mechanisms is crucial for 
determining whether a set of folk beliefs qualifies as a folk theory, then most children and 
perhaps even adults probably do not develop a “folkbiology” unless given science input.  
 
We must confess that we oscillate almost daily between thinking that: (1) children clearly 
have no folk theory in the domain of biological kinds, and (2) we are being too harsh. One 
difficulty with taking a hard line on folkbiology is that we may be forced to say that children 
(and most adults for that matter) do not have a naïve psychology either.   After all, research on 
naïve “psychology” to date seems to have focused entirely on causal relations among beliefs, 
feelings, and behaviors (e.g., Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, in press;).  It has offers no 
clue for what folk psychological causal mechanisms might look like.  So, in our more lenient 
moments, we ponder whether a foundational theory must include domain-specific causal 
mechanisms.  Might inclusion of input-output causal relations and causal agents suffice?  Should 
some day enough researchers be willing to abandon inclusion of domain-specific causal 
mechanisms as a necessary criterion for folk theories, or more specifically, for folkbiology (e.g., 
Atran, in press), we will probably be willing to credit children as well as adults with folkbiology.   
But until then…. 
 
 Second, Carey (1981, 1991, 1995) cannot be more correct in saying that children draw on 
their knowledge of people (and other everyday observable behaviors) to reason about biological 
phenomena.  However, such explanations are at best about input-output causal relations.  They 
do not provide causal mechanisms per se. 
  
Third, when children do talk about causal mechanisms in their attempts to make sense of 
biological phenomena, they almost always fall back on a folk theory that they know well--
namely, naive mechanics.  Such reliance on mechanical causality is pervasive; it is evident 
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among children across a rather wide age range (from preschool years through adolescence), 
different ethnic backgrounds, and different socioeconomic backgrounds.  To be honest, we were 
quite surprised that our Study 2 replicated virtually all of the main findings of Study 1.  Our team 
of interviewers and transcribers was convinced that we would find major differences between 
our low-income sample (Study 1) and the two samples from higher socioeconomic backgrounds 
(Study 2).  They noted that the children from the low-income sample were hard to interview 
because the children, especially the younger ones, would just sit there and say very little (see also 
Brice, 1983).   Nonetheless, when those children talked--however inarticulate they may have 
seemed--they revealed much the same kinds of beliefs as the children from the higher-income 
samples. 
  
We rest our case. 
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Table 1:  Percentage of Children in Study 1 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for Illness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCUBATION PERIOD OF COLDS 
 
 
GRADE= 
 
K 
 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
  
All 
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N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
22 14 18 15 16 10 10  105 
Biology  0 0 17% 0 6% 10% 10%  6% 
Movement of Germs 14% 14% 17% 27% 63% 70% 80%  35% 
Movement of Sickness, etc.  5% 0 22% 7% 6% 10% 0  8% 
People's Behaviors, etc. 55% 57% 33% 60% 25% 10% 10%  39% 
 
 
 
SPREADING OF SYMPTOMS TO DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY 
 
 
GRADE= 
 
K 
 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
  
All 
N= 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
22 14 18 15 16 10 10  105 
Biology  0 0 17% 0 0 10% 0  4% 
Movement of Germs 27% 7% 28% 47% 63% 70% 80%  42% 
Movement of Sickness, etc.  0 7% 17% 13% 6% 10% 0  8% 
People's Behaviors, etc. 36% 50% 33% 27% 19% 10% 20%  30% 
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Table 2:  Percentage of Children in Study 1 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for Food Spoilage 
 
 
 
FISH ON TABLE 
 
GRADE= 
 
K 
 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
  
All 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
22 14 18 15 16 10 10  105 
Biology  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Explicit Movement of Germs 18% 7% 50% 27% 25% 20% 30%  26% 
Implicit Movement of Germs 0 0 6% 0 0 0 0  1% 
Observable Events          
  relevant to mechanical transfer 36% 36% 11% 40% 31% 60% 50%  35% 
  people's behaviors 27% 43% 28% 13% 44% 20% 20%  29% 
  condition of fish 0 7% 0 13% 0 0 0  3% 
 
 
FISH IN FREEZER 
 
GRADE= 
 
K 
 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
  
All 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
22 14 18 15 16 10 10  105 
Biology  0 0 6% 7% 6% 10% 10%  5% 
Explicit Movement of Germs 9% 21% 33% 20% 38% 30% 50%  27% 
Implicit Movement of Germs 0 7% 6% 13% 0 0 10%  5% 
Observable Events          
  relevant to mechanical transfer 45% 29% 22% 33% 50% 40% 30%  36% 
  people's behaviors 23% 29% 28% 13% 6% 10% 0  17% 
  condition of fish 0 0 0 7% 0 0 0  1% 
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Table 3:  Percentage of Children in Study 1 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for an Insect’s Death 
 
 
 
          
 
GRADE= 
 
K 
 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
  
All 
N= 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
10 7 14 15 14 10 10  80 
Life Span/ Getting Old 0 14% 36% 40% 50% 60% 50%  38% 
Mechanical Causes 40% 57% 21% 20% 29% 30% 30%  30% 
Observable Nonmechanical Causes 40% 0 21% 20% 14% 10% 10%  18% 
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Table 4:  Percentage of Children in Study 1 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for Mother-Child 
Resemblance of Hair Color  
 
 
         
 
GRADE= 
 
K 
 
1st 
 
2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
 
6th 
  
All 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
22 14 18 15 16 10 10  105 
Biology  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
Explicit Transfer of Substance    14% 7% 11% 33% 19% 40% 40%  21% 
Implicit Transfer of Substance 18% 21% 33% 33% 25% 50% 40%  30% 
Parent-Child Relations 18% 36% 39% 27% 56% 10% 20%  30% 
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Table 5:  Percentage of Children in Study 2 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for Illness  
 
 
INCUBATION PERIOD OF COLDS     
 
                Middle Class Sample          Lower-Middle Class Sample 
GRADE= 1st 3rd 5th  K 1st 3rd 5th 7th  ALL 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
21 20 25  19 22 19 16 13  155 
 
Biology  
 
0 
 
5% 
 
32% 
  
0 
 
0 
 
5% 
 
13% 
 
31% 
  
10% 
 
Movement of Germs 
 
33% 
 
60% 
 
48% 
  
21% 
 
23% 
 
42% 
 
38% 
 
38% 
  
38% 
 
Movement of Sickness, etc.  
 
10% 
 
5% 
 
0 
  
5% 
 
5% 
 
0 
 
6% 
 
8% 
  
5% 
 
People's Behaviors, etc. 
 
33% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
  
63% 
 
59% 
 
21% 
 
38% 
 
23% 
  
35% 
 
 
 
SPREADING OF SYMPTOMS TO DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY 
 
                Middle Class Sample          Lower-Middle Class Sample 
GTADE= 1st 3rd 5th  K 1st 3rd 5th 7th  ALL 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
21 20 25  19 22 19 16 13  155 
 
Biology  
 
0 
 
0 
 
24% 
  
0 
 
0 
 
5% 
 
6% 
 
8% 
  
6% 
 
Movement of Germs 
 
38% 
 
70% 
 
56% 
  
21% 
 
23% 
 
58% 
 
56% 
 
69% 
  
48% 
 
Movement of Sickness, etc.  
 
14% 
 
5% 
 
8% 
  
5% 
 
14% 
 
11% 
 
19% 
 
8% 
  
10% 
 
People's Behaviors, etc. 
 
19% 
 
25% 
 
12% 
  
68% 
 
59% 
 
21% 
 
19% 
 
15% 
  
30% 
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Table 6:  Percentage of Children in Study 2 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for Food Spoilage  
 
 
 
FISH ON THE TABLE 
 
       Middle Class Sample          Lower-Middle Class Sample 
GRADE= 1st 3rd 5th  K 1st 3rd 5th 7th  ALL 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
21 20 25  19 22 19 16 13  155 
Biology  0 0 72%  0 0 0 6% 0  12% 
Explicit Movement of Germs 14% 30% 16%  26% 14% 63% 50% 54%  31% 
Implicit Movement of Germs 5% 0 4%  0 14% 0 6% 8%  5% 
Observable Events            
  relevant to mechanical transfer 33% 40% 0  16% 32% 21% 38% 23%  25% 
  people's behaviors 29% 25% 8%  53% 18% 16% 0 8%  20% 
  condition of fish 5% 5% 0  0 0 0 0 8%  2% 
 
 
 
FISH ON THE TABLE 
 
       Middle Class Sample          Lower-Middle Class Sample 
GRADE= 1st 3rd 5th  K 1st 3rd 5th 7th  ALL 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
21 20 25  19 22 19 16 13  155 
Biology  0 10% 76%  0 0 11% 6% 15%  17% 
 
Explicit Movement of Germs 
 
14% 
 
20% 
 
12% 
  
11% 
 
18% 
 
42% 
 
50% 
 
23% 
  
23% 
 
Implicit Movement of Germs 
 
0 
 
5% 
 
4% 
  
16% 
  
9% 
 
5% 
 
6% 
 
8% 
  
6% 
Observable Events            
  relevant to mechanical transfer 29% 35% 0  32% 32% 21% 38% 23%  25% 
  people's behaviors 43% 25% 4%  37% 36% 11% 0 23%  23% 
  condition of fish 0 0 0  0 5% 0 0 8%  1% 
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Table 7:  Percentage of Children in Study 2 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for an Insect’s Death 
 
 
 
                  Middle Class Sample          Lower-Middle Class Sample 
GRADE= 1st 3rd 5th  K 1st 3rd 5th 7th  ALL 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
20 20 25  14 18 18 16 13  144 
Life Span/ Getting Old 24% 30% 64%  5% 9% 32% 56% 62%  38% 
Mechanical Causes 62% 55% 36%  11% 27% 37% 38% 23%  39% 
Observable Nonmechanical Causes 5% 15% 0  11% 14% 11% 0 15%  9% 
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Table 8:  Percentage of Children in Study 2 Giving Various Kinds of Explanations for Mother-Child 
Resemblance of Hair Color  
 
 
         Middle Class Sample                 Lower-Middle Class Sample 
GRADE= 1st 3rd 5th  K 1st 3rd 5th 7th  ALL 
N = 
EXPLANATION TYPE               
21 20 25  19 22 19 16 13  155 
 
Biology 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
  
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
8% 
  
1% 
Explicit Transfer of Substance    0 15% 36%  11% 9% 21% 50% 69%  24% 
Implicit Transfer of Substance 38% 30% 24%  5% 45% 47% 19% 0  28% 
Parent-Child Relations 38% 35% 32%  37% 27% 5% 25% 23%  28% 
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Table 9:  Percentage of Children in Both Studies Giving Various Numbers of “Biological,” “Mechanical,” 
and “People/Observable Event” explanations 
 
 
 
GRADE= K 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th  ALL 
N= 
NUMBER OF EXPLANATIONS                                  
41 57 18 54 16 51 10 13  260 
 
Biological 
          
0 100% 100% 78% 85% 88% 45% 80% 46%  80% 
1 0 0 11% 15% 13% 18% 20% 38%  11% 
2 0 0 6% 0 0 18% 0 15%  5% 
3 0 0 6% 0 0 14% 0 0  3% 
4 0 0 0 0 0 4% 0 0  1% 
5 0 0 0 0 0 2% 0 0  0 
 
 
Mechanical 
          
0 49% 37% 28% 19% 13% 6% 0 0  23% 
1 22% 25% 28% 11% 13% 16% 20% 8%  18% 
2 15% 25% 6% 24% 13% 31% 20% 38%  23% 
3 10% 7% 39% 22% 56% 25% 20% 31%  21% 
4 5% 5% 0 15% 6% 18% 10% 15%  10% 
5 0 2% 0 9% 0 4% 30% 8%  5% 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
 
 
People/ Observable Event 
          
0 12% 7% 11% 28% 19% 43% 60% 23%  23% 
1 20% 32% 33% 31% 6% 22% 10% 31%  25% 
2 22% 26% 17% 13% 38% 25% 20% 31%  23% 
3 20% 19% 28% 17% 31% 2% 10% 15%  16% 
4 15% 7% 6% 9% 6% 4% 0 0  7% 
5 7% 7% 6% 2% 0 2% 0 0  4% 
6 5% 2% 0 0 0 2% 0 0  2% 
 
